Does the Chancellor deny that ultimate responsibility for the Crisis in Northern Rock, which has done such worldwide damage to the reputation of British banking, lies with our present Prime Minister for removing banking supervision from the lender of last resort?
The Minister whom I quoted was, of course, speaking before the Northern Rock Crisis occurred.
The Treasury Committee met because of the Northern Rock Crisis.
On Tuesday, the Governor of the Bank of England said that the Northern Rock Crisis could have been prevented, had the Chancellor acted earlier.
Recent weeks have witnessed a series of events that have raised fundamental questions about the competence of the present Government - the handling of the Northern Rock Crisis, the loss by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs of the personal details of millions of families, and now allegations of illegal fundraising.
In response to the Northern Rock Crisis, the Government found £25 billion of taxpayers' money.
Yesterday the Prime Minister evaded specific questions about the cost of the Northern Rock Crisis to the taxpayer.
That emblem was clear from the moment that the Northern Rock Crisis broke.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people in my constituency, in the north of England, and indeed in the City believe that the Government's handling of the Northern Rock Crisis has been first-rate?
Those losses and that distrust have also stymied the Government's efforts in the past five months to get a private sector solution to the Northern Rock Crisis.
On23 September last year, only a week or so after the Northern Rock Crisis broke publicly, the BBC reported that at least 12 of the UK and Europe's biggest banks had declined to buy the bank.
Fourthly, the process of finding a buyer and of arriving at a resolution of the Northern Rock Crisis was too long drawn out and the initial process was unsuccessful.
In the Northern Rock Crisis, under the new regulatory system the Governor of the Bank of England is fighting with his hands tied behind his back and, at times, blindfolded.
When the Northern Rock Crisis broke last autumn, the Prime Minister was, as we all know, dithering and shilly-shallying over whether to call a general election.
We should ask why, over that long and difficult, and rather cold and wet summer, the British authorities were unable to take pre-emptive action of a kind that might have prevented the Northern Rock Crisis from developing as rapidly as it did.
We should ask why, over that long and difficult, and rather cold and wet summer, the British authorities were unable to take pre-emptive action of a kind that might have prevented the Northern Rock Crisis developing as rapidly as it did.
If we were to continue in that way, by 2013 we would have a surplus in the national insurance scheme that could fund a rescue in Another Northern Rock Crisis, if there was one.
He also contrasted the rapid resolution at Bear Stearns over the past 72 hours with the prolonged agony of dithering indecision that we have been forced to ensure as the Chancellor faced the Northern Rock Crisis.
The Government's mishandling of the Northern Rock Crisis has led to the risk that taxpayers will not get back all the money we have lent to the bank.
One criticism made by both Labour and Conservative Members was that the Bank of England and its Governor did not act when the credit crunch started and we had the Northern Rock Crisis.
One criticism raised by both Labour and Conservative Members was that the Bank of England and its Governor did not act when the credit crunch started and we had the Northern Rock Crisis.
However, when a Northern Rock Crisis emerges, some of those people change their tune and call for more regulation.
It is in response to the Recent Northern Rock Crisis, which represents the first run on a UK high street bank in the post-war era, and the systemic failure manifest in the worldwide banking system.
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme did not deal with the Northern Rock Crisis and the Government had to go way beyond guaranteeing retail depositors as they progressed through their messy journey towards privatisation, de facto guaranteeing the whole of the liabilities of Northern Rock.
Would the mortgage market not be working better if the Chancellor had not dithered and delayed for so long about the necessary banking reforms in the light of the Northern Rock Crisis?
One thing that came through to me loud and clear in the discussion of the Northern Rock Crisis was that few people had the faintest idea what level of guarantee the FSCs applied to deposits anyway.
I do not see why measures to improve depositor protection could not have been introduced immediately after we returned from the summer recess last year, after the Crisis in Northern Rock.
All those other documents were informed mainly by the Northern Rock Crisis.
At the time of the Northern Rock Crisis, we saw those institutions initially minding their own backs and guarding their turf, rather than working collectively to reach a common position.
I remind Labour Members that the new banking regulatory system, which was put in place 10 years ago by the then Chancellor, now Prime Minister, and the then Chief Secretary, now Chancellor, was found wanting a year ago when the Northern Rock Crisis took place and the Financial Services Authority itself admitted that it had not regulated properly.
If we cast our minds back to last year when the Northern Rock Crisis first emerged, a number of things were not right.
I was the chair of the previous consumer organisation when the Northern Rock Crisis first came on our television screens and the queues were outside the banking branches.
First, it begins to put the Bank of England back at the centre of our financial system, which the Treasury Committee recommended in its major report on the Northern Rock Crisis.
The Minister rightly said that Mr John McFall in another place asked that question during the Northern Rock Crisis and got no answer.
I want to speak briefly about what might be called the public genesis of the recession in the UK - the Northern Rock Crisis.
The Northern Rock Crisis had already taken place, some months earlier.
At the beginning of his speech I was somewhat grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, because at least he started to put the order and the reconstruction of the bank into the context of the events that led up to the Crisis in Northern Rock two years ago.
The Governor of the Bank of England, at least two years before the Northern Rock Crisis, issued a warning that he felt that the markets were mispricing risk.
Under the arrangements that existed before the Northern Rock Crisis, there was a Memorandum of Understanding between the three bits of the tripartite authorities.
It was perfectly apparent at the time of the Northern Rock Crisis that the Government were, as my noble friend said, at sixes and sevens, and that it was unclear who was in charge.
The tripartite authorities had hardly met formally at principal level until the Northern Rock Crisis.
May I bring the right hon. Gentleman back to the point he was making and remind him that when the Northern Rock Crisis hit, my right hon. Friend the Business Secretary immediately proposed that nationalisation was the correct way forward, and that the Government whom the right hon. Gentleman represented prevaricated for six months before taking that action?
The Tory spin doctors forget that if we had followed the first reaction to the Northern Rock Crisis from the then shadow Chancellor,the right hon. Member for Tatton (Mr Osborne), we would have let Northern Rock go, which would have had a knock-on effect on other banking systems and the recession would have turned into a depression.
That is the question that was asked by Lord McFall at the time of the Northern Rock Crisis.
To develop that point, parts of the economy are doing significantly better than others and have not been affected by this cyclical change, which has lasted since the onset of the Northern Rock Crisis of 2007-08 and the wider banking crisis.