Like some of my hon. Friends who have spoken from this side, I do not propose to concentrate unduly on the present Crisis in Berlin.
I wish to emphasise that This Berlin Crisis is part of something very much larger.
I believe that it is imperative and of the utmost urgency that His Majesty's Government should not merely work out a plan to deal with the Present Berlin Crisis, but also work out what they are going to do after that.
I believe that it is imperative and of the utmost urgency that His Majesty's Government should not merely work out a plan to deal with the present Berlin Crisis, but also work out what they are going to do after that.
Mr. Emrys Hughes asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will agree to the request, made by Mr. Trygve Lie and Dr. Evatt, urging the leaders of the four Great Powers to meet to consider further the Crisis in Berlin.
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will agree to the request, made by Mr. Trygve Lie and Dr. Evatt, urging the leaders of the four Great Powers to meet to consider further the Crisis in Berlin.
Germany, Berlin Crisis and proposed Four-Power meeting, 353, 354, 1226, 1227.
Last year for instance at the time of the Berlin Crisis it was very opportune to do one or two things quietly and unobtrusively.
After the Berlin Crisis certain things happened.
In August, 1948, following the Berlin Crisis, a number of emergency measures were taken to increase the production of existing types of fighters and to refurbish some of the war-time stocks of piston-engined fighters.
During the Berlin Crisis of 1948, local authorities were asked to preserve as many as possible of the existing tanks.
I cannot help believing that the Present Berlin Crisis provides an opportunity for the West to take the initiative in these matters.
There are people on both sides of the Iron Curtain who want to increase, not to relax, tension, and who are now trying to exploit the Berlin Crisis for this purpose.
Secondly, it is today generally recognised - I believe it has been formally accepted by the Government - that in the matter of attempting to relax European tension - that is what we are discussing in connection with the Berlin Crisis - we ought to adopt a stage by stage, or empirical, approach.
I would, therefore, prefer to see a continuation of the cold war of the last ten years since the Berlin Crisis of 1948–49 rather than give way, weaken the whole of our defensive system and put ourselves at a complete disadvantage in relation to the Russians.
The Berlin Crisis is only a symptom of a malignant and spreading disease -a disease of fear and suspicion that is growing greater and not less.
It is infinitely more dangerous than the Crisis in Berlin, it is more dangerous than the crisis in Cuba and what might follow from that, and also it is more dangerous than the situation in Quemoy and Matsu and the offshore islands.
In view of the Present Berlin Crisis, does not my right hon. Friend feel that it is necessary to restore the service to the number of hours that were being broadcast some three years ago?
One of the most fruitful vistas opened by the present state of the Berlin Crisis is the chance at last of seriously officially exploring in formal negotiations the possibility referred to by the Prime Minister in his communiqué with Mr. Khrushchev two years ago of establishing the control of arms and forces in an agreed area of Central Europe.
I wholly agree with the Lord Privy Seal that the Berlin Crisis has been artificially manufactured by Mr. Khrushchev, that it is impossible to justify his statement that he intends unilaterally to extinguish Western rights in Berlin and the Western right of access in Berlin.
The real danger of war over the Berlin Crisis arises for a reason which I think has not been sufficiently recognised until now on either side of the Iron Curtain.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal about the great importance of its being clearly understood that the Berlin Crisis, if it comes to a crisis - as it well may - is not in any way of our making.
Powers mean every word of what they say about the future of West Berlin, there need not be Any Berlin Crisis.
First, just to get the record straight again after some of the things which have been said, if there is a Crisis in Berlin at present it is certainly not of our making, nor that of our allies.
Mr. Milne asked the Lord Privy Seal why authorisation was given for the issue of an official statement on call-up preparations to met the Berlin Crisis before a statement was made to the House.
Mr. Godber: No official statement has been made on call-up preparations to met the Berlin Crisis.
There are talks of Crisis in Berlin.
We have the Berlin Crisis, as it is called.
Is the Prime Minister aware that the Berlin Crisis has demonstrated the complete failure of the nuclear deterrent policy, and increased public desire that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should concentrate on finding a constructive alternative to this bankrupt policy, instead of indulging in cheap sneers against supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament?
The reason was, he said, that the Berlin Crisis was too dangerous to be allowed to drift.
The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister gave the lead at Gleneagles, and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was quite right to say that, for sheer inanity, coming from the Prime Minister, his phrase about the Berlin Crisis just being got up by the Press would take some beating.
All I am saying is that the responsibility for the Crisis in Berlin at the moment lies fairly and squarely at the door of the Soviet Union and that we in the West must make it abundantly clear that we do not want war, but that if there is war over Berlin the responsibility is there, and not here.
There are, I think, three elements in the Berlin Crisis to be dealt with at once.
Whatever happens, we must not give way on things about which we cannot negotiate yet we must attemptto solve the Berlin Crisis and, if possible, try to get a German peace treaty, which, alas, is long overdue.
We were all concerned about the Recent Berlin Crisis and the deepening international situation which arose during the Recess.
The first is that it is rather a belated reaction to a series of crises, particularly to the Berlin Crisis which came to a head a few weeks ago.
It seems to me that what we are forgetting in the consideration of this problem of the Berlin Crisis is that the essence of a partial solution—I shall not say a complete solution—is the acceptance of compromise.
In the same speech yesterday, Mr. Khrushchev made some remarks about the Berlin Crisis which offer us increased hope of a settlement.
I think that the tone of much of British Press comments on the Berlin Crisis in recent months must have seemed to many honest, decent, democratic Germans to be quite unforgivable.
The Berlin Crisis and the Russian resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests are but two of the factors which make it difficult to envisage at this moment a favourable climate for disarmament discussions.
What we had in mind was not so much a debate, although that was inevitable, but the putting forward of some constructive and fruitful proposals to deal with what some of us regard as the focal point of danger, namely, the Berlin Crisis.
Both our political parties have, over the Berlin Crisis, shown their standard reflexes.
Before the Berlin Crisis I had long wished to reduce our continental commitments and resume our seaboard strategy.
Mr. Shinwell asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the present position in the Berlin Crisis.
asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the present position in the Berlin Crisis.
Secondly, the continuance of the Berlin Crisis has highlighted some of the temporary difficulties which we knew we would pass through in 1962 and 1963, during the period of transition from conscription to the all-Regular forces, and these two factors together make it necessary for us to take special steps to keep up the strength of the Army.
I repudiate as an insult to my intelligence the idea that the situation with which we are now confronted arises specifically from the Berlin Crisis.
Even within the last day or two attention has been momentarily distracted from the Berlin Crisis by the emergence of a Finnish crisis which may turn out to be very serious too.
The suggestion that if there had not been a Berlin Crisis there would not have been an Army manpower crisis was absurd.
That was less than a year ago, and all my constituents could have predicted an Acute Berlin Crisis long before that date.
Mr. Zilliacus asked the Minister of Defence if he will now withdraw British forces from Western Germany, in view of the refusal of Britain's allies to begin negotiations with a view to coming to a reasonable settlement of the Berlin Crisis.
asked the Minister of Defence if he will now withdraw British forces from Western Germany, in view of the refusal of Britain's allies to begin negotiations with a view to coming to a reasonable settlement of the Berlin Crisis.
Supposing the Berlin Crisis were to develop in a most unhappy way six months from now and the Bill said that the Acts should be continued merely for six months; we would then find ourselves in the unhappy position of our six-monthly attention coinciding with that crisis and it being impossible for adequate consideration to be given to further extensions.
The Berlin Crisis and the subsequent mounting international tension have, of course, caused the Government much anxious concern and the threat to Berlin sets us a very difficult problem at a time when the part-conscript Army is runningdown towards the minimum all-regular strength of 165,000.
Later in 1961, the Berlin Crisis arose, with the cry for more conventional forces in Europe.
Therefore, when the Leader of the House talked about Berlin and our contribution to the Berlin Crisis he was talking nonsense.
Implicit in what the right hon. Gentleman said what the fact that he was tying all this up with the Crisis in Berlin.
If that is so, very little is left of the argument that this is connected with the Berlin Crisis.
May we be assured that President de Gaulle will not be allowed to veto an East-West conference with a view to securing a peaceful settlement of the Berlin Crisis, and that following the Ministers' meeting in Paris in mid-December there will be a conference with the Soviet Union on this crisis?
Mr. A. Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether he will meet Dr. Adenauer to discuss the Berlin Crisis.
Mr. Emrys Hughes asked the Prime Minister if he will now state his arrangements for meeting Dr. Adenauer to discuss the Berlin Crisis.
asked the Prime Minister whether he will meet Dr. Adenauer to discuss the Berlin Crisis.
asked the Prime Minister if he will now state his arrangements for meeting Dr. Adenauer to discuss the Berlin Crisis.
This is not a Bill just to deal with the Berlin Crisis.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East rightly said, to suggest that this Bill is the result of the Berlin Crisis is nonsense.
I should be interested if the Miniter would say - and this is a question which a non-expert like myself is entitled to ask - whether these powers to extend the engagements for 15,000 men is a result of the Berlin Crisis and is designed to meet that crisis in Europe.
As to his further statement about the business for Thursday, 14th December, while we quite understand that there should be a debate now on the Congo alone, and why the Government wish it to arise on a Government Motion, does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the original proposal of the Government was a debate on foreign affairs generally and that the Berlin Crisis, apart from anything else, is very urgent?
If the Bill is a contribution to the solution of the Berlin Crisis, none of us can go away for Christmas feeling very happy.
In Germany we are performing - in what the right hon. Gentleman chooses to call the Berlin Crisis - a part in something that has been with us for the last fifteen years.
We have heard before that these 15,000 men are to be called up to deal with the Berlin Crisis.
There was a time when the Government seemed to be linking that with the Crisis in Berlin.
The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) suggested that the purpose of the Army Reserve Bill was to deal with the Berlin Crisis.
But this has nothing to do with such things as the Berlin Crisis, for example.
It is not the Berlin Crisis; that is on the table for the moment.
On Second Reading the Secretary of State explained that the Bill was because of the Berlin Crisis.
Therefore, because of the Berlin Crisis earlier last year, the Government have, I think rightly, decided that from time to time they need, because of the cold war, the power to call up reserves and have them immediately available.
The Berlin Crisis has nothing to do with the Bill.
We have reinforced these since the beginning of the Berlin Crisis by additional Javelins and by periodic detachments of Lightnings.
I do not suggest that these modest proposals of mine should take the place of any present disarmament proposals but what I have in mind is that I should judge we are about due for a recurrence of the Berlin Crisis.
All that the Russians would have to do would be to provoke a new Crisis in Berlin and say, "We will call off this crisis provided the rocket bases in England are dismantled".
It is the visit to Moscow at the time of the Berlin Crisis without informing or consulting his allies and for which, of course, Adenauer has never forgiven him.
We were glad to see that in the same quarter, the recruiting rate was higher than in any corresponding quarter in any previous year except 1961, which was exceptional because of the Berlin Crisis.
It went over the manpower policy of the Government, which we have dealt with on many occasions, and then, in paragraph 6, it stated:The best way to achieve this for the Immediate Berlin Crisis is, of course, to make use of men who are already in the Army, trained and equipped.
We have done so partly because of our deterrent force, partly by a bit of luck, and partly, perhaps, because Russia never really intended to do what we thought she might do, certainly not after the Berlin Crisis - that is, physically to try and occupy the rest of Europe, although we knew very well that, if she had wanted to, she could have swept through Europe, including B.A.O.R.
I know that he made it in the context of the Berlin Crisis, because that happened to be the crisis of the time, but I quoted the date.
Yet today we have the conspicuous fact that the United States refrained from over-reacting in the Recent Berlin Crisis.
My analysis of the debate, with all the difficulties which have interposed themselves, is that there is a genuine community of feeling in this House about the need to move forward to détente, but there is also a demand from the House - I put it as high as a demand - that if we are to move forward, the Russians and their colleagues have to show the seriousness of their desire to do so by helping us over the Berlin Crisis.
However, in 1948 that was also overtaken by events - the decision by a small group of Labour Ministers to allow United States bombers to be based in Great Britain during the Berlin Crisis of that year.